Mexico implements the MTU to reinforce security in transfers

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The Implementation of the User Transaction Amount in the Mexican Banking System

As a precautionary measure to reduce incidents of financial fraud and strengthen digital security protocols, as of October 1, 2025, banking institutions operating in Mexico have the regulatory obligation to enable the functionality for their clients to define the maximum limit in their interbank transfer operations, officially known as the User Transaction Amount (MTU).

In accordance with provisions issued by the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV), the supervisory body of the financial system, the MTU constitutes an additional authentication mechanism in electronic transactions that users carry out through mobile applications or internet banking platforms. Although the technical authorization begins in October, this security factor will be mandatory for natural persons as of January 1, 2026.

RelatedBanco del Bienestar is saved from the MTU due to its lack of digital banking

Operating Mechanics and Transfer Limit Configuration

As detailed by the banking authority, each account holder will be able to establish in a personalized way the maximum transactional amount that they consider appropriate for their usual financial operations. Customers will have two main channels to configure this parameter: through digital banking systems (online or mobile) or through in-person assistance at bank branches.

The CNBV has established a specific procedure for cases in which users do not exercise their right to actively configure this limit. If by December 31, 2025 a client has not defined their personalized MTU, the corresponding banking institution will automatically assign a default limit of 12,800 Mexican pesos. This automatic amount will be determined by algorithms that analyze the user’s transactional history, considering behavior patterns, average transfer amounts and the risk profile associated with the account.

It is essential to understand that this measure does not restrict access to funds deposited in bank accounts. Clients’ money will remain fully available and liquid. The implementation of the MTU operates as an additional security barrier: when a user attempts to make a transfer that exceeds the limit established in their MTU, the banking system will require an additional identification factor before processing the operation. This second authentication factor will be defined by each financial institution according to its internal security protocols and could include various methods such as verification via phone call, SMS text message, push notification through mobile application or confirmation via email.

Regulatory Context and Mitigation of Disinformation

The implementation of the MTU is part of a comprehensive cyber financial security strategy that Mexican authorities have been developing in response to the significant increase in the sophistication and frequency of digital financial crimes. Over the past few years, a growing pattern of incidents of identity theft, bank phishing, and unauthorized transfers has been observed, prompting the creation of more robust protection mechanisms.

In this context, it is pertinent to address and categorically deny the erroneous information that has circulated in some digital spaces. Contrary to what is stated in certain viral messages, the MTU does not represent a government restriction on the free disposal of financial resources, it does not imply the imposition of administrative fines for its non-configuration, and it does not generate additional costs for users for its activation or modification. The nature of this measure is exclusively preventive and is aimed at creating an additional layer of protection for consumers of financial services.

The flexibility of the system allows users to modify their MTU at any time based on their changing financial needs. However, any adjustment that involves a substantial increase in the transactional limit will likely require an additional confirmation process with the banking institution, precisely to ensure that the modification is a conscious and authorized decision by the legitimate account holder.

As the CNBV has explained in its official statements, “the MTU is a proactive security limit that each user selects for their operations in electronic channels. Its implementation seeks to effectively prevent fraud and cases of identity theft by incorporating an additional verification step in transactions that, due to their amount, could represent a significant risk to the user’s assets.”

The implementation schedule establishes clear milestones: starting October 1, 2025, banking entities must have the functionality available; December 31, 2025 marks the deadline for users to voluntarily establish their preferred amount; and starting January 1, 2026, the system will come into full effect with automatic limits applying to those who have not made their personalized settings. It is important to note that even after this last date, users retain the ability to modify their MTU at any time, adjusting it downwards or upwards according to their specific requirements.

This initiative represents a significant advance in financial consumer protection in the digital era, aligning with best international practices in banking security. Countries with more developed financial systems have implemented similar mechanisms with positive results in reducing electronic fraud, demonstrating that financial education combined with appropriate technological tools constitutes the most effective strategy to protect users’ assets.

Are you worried about the security of your online banking operations? Share this crucial information on your social networks to help more people understand this new protection mechanism and visit our personal finance section to discover more content on how to effectively protect your financial resources in the digital environment.

FDA recognizes false positive in Taylor Farms lettuce

Cofepris analysis rules out contamination; FDA admits error in initial sample.

Analysis results

The Ministry of Health reported that tests carried out on lettuce and water samples from the Taylor Farms Mexico plant were negative for the parasite Cyclospora cayetanensis —which causes severe diarrhea— and also for fecal coliforms. The analyses, carried out by Cofepris, confirmed that the product complies with the physicochemical parameters established in national standards.

Traceability and false positive

Taylor Farms has a traceability system that allowed United States authorities to identify the origin of the product and track a batch held at customs in Laredo, Texas. That batch never entered US territory.

The sample obtained from that batch returned a false positive, a situation that the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recognized in an update published on July 19. The Ministry of Health emphasized that the product is suitable for human consumption.

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UIF identifies 55 people in the CJNG financial network

The FIU detected 55 people linked to a CJNG financial network, including 16 front companies.

The Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) of Mexico detected 55 people allegedly linked to a financial network of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). The finding was achieved through specific financial indicators, as reported by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP).

Release 61 details that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury designated 55 people – 39 individuals and 16 legal entities – related to this structure. The action is part of bilateral cooperation against the finances of organized crime.

Indicators detected

The FIU identified “indicators related to possible operations with resources of illicit origin.” Among them: cash operations, acquisition of high-end vehicles, jewelry and real estate, international transfers, intensive use of credit and service cards, and inconsistencies in income reported to the SAT.

The authorities detected “possible inconsistencies between the income reported to the tax authority and the resources observed in the financial system,” which strengthened the identification of the network.

Front companies and complaints

Of the total, 16 legal entities had illegal activities. According to the FIU, some registered relevant operations, while others were front companies with “limited or no apparent economic activity.”

The UIF filed a complaint with the Attorney General’s Office (FGR) for the crime of operations with resources of illicit origin. It also included the subjects designated by OFAC on the List of Blocked Persons (LPB), and added eight additional ones—four individuals and four legal entities—linked to the same financial structure.

International coordination

The Treasury stressed that the coordinated actions with the United States seek to “prevent improper use of the financial system, combat money laundering and weaken the economic structures of organized crime.” The FIU maintains cooperation with national and international authorities, in accordance with the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

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US Treasury locates Florence as a drug production center

The Treasury Department identified the Zacatecas municipality as the CJNG base for fentanyl and cocaine.

The United States Department of the Treasury identified Florencia de Benito Juárez, Zacatecas, as one of the key points of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) to manufacture fentanyl, cocaine and methamphetamine.

According to the agency, José Octaviano García Martínez is the current head of the plaza in the area, accompanied by Cuauhtémoc Rivera Zepeda and Uriel Hernández Morales. These last two would be in charge of the clandestine laboratories in Zacatecas and Jalisco. All three report to Audias Flores Silva—alias El Jardinero—, designated as successor to the late leader Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, El Mencho.

Criminal presence in a small municipality

Florencia de Benito Juárez barely covers 328 square kilometers in the south of the state, in the Sierra Madre Occidental, adjacent to Jalisco. Despite its size, the municipality has been the scene of organized crime operations.

In March 2025, authorities dismantled a camp used by a criminal cell. Months later, in June, they destroyed a greenhouse used for growing marijuana. Both operations sought to neutralize illegal infrastructure.

The municipal president elected in 2024 is Fortino Cortés Ramírez, who will conclude his term in 2027.

Recent violence and federal response

On Saturday, July 18, 2025, 10 bodies were found in the municipalities of Morelos, Pánuco and Sain Alto. Of the victims, six were construction, mining and entertainment businessmen. Two others were officials of the Fresnillo city council: Fidel Alvarado de la Torre, secretary of Municipal Social Development, and firefighter Jesús Gerardo Muñetón Hernández.

Given these events, the Secretariat of National Defense deployed 100 Special Forces elements on July 22. They joined the 400 Army and National Guard troops who had already been operating since July 19. They carry out ground reconnaissance and deterrent actions in Zacatecas, Guadalupe and Fresnillo.

The conflict in the region is not new. On May 20, 2011, a clash between rival groups—known as The Florence War—left 77 people dead. The journalist Alfredo Valadez Rodríguez documented this episode in the book of the same name, published by Ediciones Proceso in 2021.

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